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Abstract 
Gunawardena, J., Causal automata, Theoretical Computer Science 101 (1992) 265-288. 
We introduce causal automata, a formalism based on a syntactic approach to causality in contrast 
to conventional approaches based on partial orders. Our main result is the following characterisa- 
tion of Milner’s notion of confluence in CCS: Confluence= Determinism+{AND, OR} Causality. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we introduce causal automata, a formalism based on a syntactic 
approach to causality in contrast to conventional approaches based on partial orders. 
The motivation for this comes from Milner’s notion of confluence in CCS ([15, 
Chapter lo], [16, Chapter 111). This is a strong labelled version of the confluence 
that is customarily studied in term rewriting systems, cf. [ll]. Causal automata 
provide the following insight into confluence in Milner’s sense: 
Confluence = Determinism + {AND, OR} Causality. 
A precise statement is given in Theorem 1.6. We restrict attention to the finite case, 
for reasons which are discussed below. A more general and systematic study of 
causality will appear in a sequel to the present paper, [8]. 
Although the motivation for our results comes from CCS the results are stated 
and proved without any direct reference to Milner’s calculus. We have, therefore, 
devoted an extended introductory section to giving an informal explanation of the 
origin of our ideas. 
1.1. Determinism and confluence 
Milner’s notion of confluence in CCS is closely related to, but distinct from, the 
customary idea of confluence in term rewriting systems. Huet [l l] has studied 
confluence in the abstract setting of a binary relation (reduction) on sets. For our 
purposes we can think of this as a transition system: a pair (S, -) where S is a set 
and + c SX S is a transition relation. We use the notation + for the reflexive- 
transitive closure of -+ . 
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Definition 1.1. A transition system is confluent (in the general sense) if whenever 
E + F and E + G, it is possible to find H E S such that F + H and G 4 H. 
Confluence implies the Church-Rosser property: normal forms, if they exist, are 
unique. Newman [ 171 seems to have been the first to use the word confluence. Keller 
[13] pointed out the importance of confluence in several areas of parallel computa- 
tion: parallel programme schemata, vector replacement systems, switching theory. 
Huet’s elegant paper [ 111 is itself a point of confluence for much earlier work. 
Milner’s notion of confluence in CCS [16, Section 11.31 is a stronger labelled 
form of confluence. To describe it we need some notation. ti* will denote strings 
over the label set &. The empty string will be denoted by E, concatenation of strings 
by juxtaposition, st, or, when clarity dictates, by s.t. The excess of s over t [16, 
Definition 6, Section 11.31 denoted s/f, is defined recursively by the rules below. 
e/t=e, 
(as)/t= 
a(slr) if a does not appear in t, 
s/( r/a) otherwise. 
For instance, abadcal caab = badcal cab = adcal ca = dca/ c = da. 
Consider labelled transition systems of the form (S, -+, a*) where the labels are 
strings and the transition relation, + c S x &* x S, is “closed”: E 4 F and F 1. G 
implies E 3 G. Such a system might come from taking the transitive closure of a 
labelled binary relation or by applying more complex transformations as in the 
relation P & Q of CCS [ 16, Section 5. I], where hidden actions are ignored. 
Definition 1.2. A labelled transition system is c&Zuent (in the sense of Mifner) if 
whenever E 4- F and E h G, it is possible to find H e S such that F A H and 
GA H. 
In this paper we use the word confluent in this stronger labelled sense. We should 
point out that the definition of a confluent process in CCS, [15, Proposition 111, 
also incorporates an appropriate equivalence relation on CCS terms, such as weak 
bisimulation. The definition given above is sufficient for our purposes; it makes 
apparent the relationship with confluence in the general sense. In the rest of this 
paper we shall be largely concerned with confluent trace sets. 
Definition 1.3. A set of strings Ts A@ is a conjluent trace set if T is a trace set (i.e.: 
EE T and rss T + rE T) and 
r, s E T j r(s/r) E T. 
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If a labelled transition system arises by transitive closure and is confluent in the 
sense of Definition 1.2, then for each element E E S, the set of strings {s 1 ~FE S 
with E 1, F} forms a confluent trace set. 
Mimer’s introduction of confluence was motivated by his work on determinism. 
(We use the word determinism in preference to Milner’s determinucy.) There seems 
to be some confusion about the exact meaning of this word. For us it will always 
mean that the past determines the present. This corresponds to the dictionary 
definition of determinism’ and is the one adopted by Mimer for CCS [16, Chapter 
11, Definition 31 (weak determinacy), and by Vaandrager [22, Section 3.61 for event 
structures. Note that it differs from the one used by Aceto et al. in [l, Definition 
3.31. Keller uses determinism in the same sense as we do [13, Definition 1.3(D)], 
but uses determinacy to mean something analogous to the Church-Rosser property. 
By way of example, the CCS process r.a.nil+ T.b.nil is not deterministic, since to 
begin with it may sometimes be prepared to offer a and sometimes not. One 
frequently encounters the assertion that the process a.b.ni/+ b.a.nil “exhibits sequen- 
tial nondeterminism”. As far as we are concerned, this process is perfectly determinis- 
tic; it merely offers an initial choice between the actions a and b. 
Deterministic systems are interesting for two main reasons. They occur widely in 
real life and they are particularly easy to reason about: their behaviour is determined 
by trace-level information. This “folk theorem” has to be stated differently depending 
on the formalism which is used. Mimer shows ([ 16, Chapter 11, Proposition 51) 
that two deterministic CCS processes are weakly bisimilar if, and only if, they have 
the same set of traces. Vaandrager shows in [22, Section 5.11 that two deterministic 
event structures are isomorphic if, and only if, they have the same set of step 
sequences. 
The problem with determinism in CCS is that it lacks compositionality. If we 
place two deterministic CCS processes in parallel, the result need not be determinis- 
tic, as the example of u.6.d 1 u.c.nil shows. Similarly for most of the other algebraic 
operators in CCS. This is a serious difficulty, because we would like to infer the 
property of determinism from the syntactic structure of a CCS term. Milner’s 
approach to this problem is to introduce the stronger property of confluence. 
Confluent processes are necessarily deterministic although not all deterministic 
processes are confluent. Confluence does exhibit some compositionality. Milner 
shows that certain derived operations in CCS, in particular a form of restricted 
parallel composition, do preserve confluence [ 16, Chapter 11, Proposition 171. This 
provides a method for building up confluent, and hence deterministic, processes. 
Rem [20] and others have considered a similar notion, conservatism, in CSP for 
much the same reasons. 
Up to now we have made no mention of causality. Indeed, causality is frequently 
associated with “true concurrency” in antagonism to the interleaving semantics of 
’ The philosophical doctrine that all events are fully determined by preceding events. (Collins 
Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, 1986.) 
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CCS [19]. Perhaps one of the messages of this paper is that causality is a valuable 
tool with which to study any semantics, interleaving or otherwise. 
We became interested, independently of Milner’s work and for rather pragmatic 
reasons, [7, Section 31, in deducing the causal relationships between observable 
actions in a CCS process. Our methods led us to a subset of finite CCS processes 
that we called purely parallel, cf. [6,7], for which we proved the following result 
([7, Theorem 31). 
Theorem 1.4. There exists a function y, which associates to each purely parallel process 
P a finite deterministic labelled poset y(P) such that traces(P) = seq( y( P)). This 
function induces a one-to-one correspondence between equivalence classes, under weak 
bisimulation, of purely parallel processes and finite deterministic pomsets. 
The sequences of a labelled poset are the prefixes of its linearizations. A labelled 
poset, and the corresponding pomset, is deterministic if no two events with the same 
label are concurrent. This used to be referred to as “absence of auto-concurrency”. 
It corresponds exactly to Vaandrager’s definition of determinism if a poset is regarded 
as a conflict-free prime event structure. 
This result gives a denotational semantics to the language of purely parallel 
processes which is fully abstract for weak bisimulation. (In fact, it gives rather more, 
and the extra information is quite valuable in practice, cf. [7, Section 3.21.) If we 
note that posets, in the absence of additional structure, can only capture AND 
causality, we can summarise the result in the following informal way: 
Pure Parallelism = Determinism+{AND} Causality. 
While this work was in progress, Robin Milner pointed out to us that the operations 
used to build up purely parallel processes are exactly those which preserve con- 
fluence. This crucial observation raised the following question. Do we get all 
confluent processes, or at least the finite ones, in this way? The answer is no, not 
even up to weak bisimulation, as the following example shows: 
It is not hard to prove that this process is confluent, see [6, Section 71. (Readers 
may like to convince themselves that traces(C) is at least a confluent trace set.) If 
C were weakly bisimilar to a purely parallel process, Theorem 1.4 would imply the 
existence of a poset having the following set of sequences: 
{E, a, b, ac, bc, ab, acb, bca, abc}. 
In such a poset, the events a and b would have to be initial but c could not be, 
since c does not appear initially. But if c were dependent on a then the sequence 
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Fig. 1. Net with OR causality. 
bca would not be possible; similarly if c were dependent on b the sequence acb 
would not be possible. Hence no such poset can exist. It follows that the process 
C is confluent but cannot be built, even upto weak bisimulation, by the operations 
which are known to preserve confluence. This counterexample is the starting point 
of this paper. 
1.2. Causal automata 
It is instructive to follow the philosophy of [6] and to work out the causal 
relationships between the observable actions in the process C above. The actions 
a and b are causally independent and can appear in any order in the traces of C. 
However, c cannot appear until either a or b has appeared. The simplest, and, in 
our view, the most insightful way to describe this behaviour is to say that c depends 
causally on a OR b. 
The idea of OR causality seems a very natural one. However, none of the 
formalisms used for specifying reactive systems, cf. [9], seem to provide a convenient 
way to express it. For instance, example C is equivalent to one given by Winskel 
[23, page 71, as an illustration of instability in event structures. Most authors, cf. 
[ 1,2,3,5, l&22,23], have studied stable event structures and have found instability 
to be either unnecessary or undesirable. Of the available formalisms, Petri nets 
provide the most painless way to represent OR causality, as shown in Fig. 1, albeit 
at the expense of resorting to unsafe nets. In this paper we would like to take 
causality more seriously by introducing causal automata, a formalism in which 
causal relationships like OR causality can be easily expressed. 
Definition 1.5. A causal automaton consists of a finite set E of events and a function 
p : E + BE, from E to the free Boolean algebra BE generated by E. 
The restriction to finite sets of events will hold throughout this paper. We discuss 
the difficulties with the infinite case in Section 1.4 below. Causal automata are 
conveniently specified in tabular form, as shown below. The first column gives the 
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events e while the second gives p(e). 
Cl= c2= 
a lb 
b 111 
c3= 
el es * e4 
e2 el 
es el * e2 
e4 es 
The Boolean expression p(e) represents the causal “guard” which must become 
TRUE before the event e can occur. Initially, no events have occurred. This is 
expressed by setting each of the generators e E E to FALSE. The expressions p(e) 
then simplify to some truth value. Those events for which p(e) becomes TRUE are 
said to be enabled and may occur. The others, for which p(e) evaluates to FALSE, 
cannot yet do so. 
If an event e occurs, then it should be removed from the set E of events. However, 
the causal guards of the remaining events may still contain e. We may express the 
fact that e has occurred by setting e to TRUE, thereby removing the generator e 
from the values of the function p. It should now be clear that we have constructed 
a new causal automaton F where F = E - {e} and pF(x) = pE (x)[ e + T] for each 
x E F. The automaton E has engaged in the event e and evolved into the automaton 
F. 
The example Cl represents the same behaviour as the CCS process C described 
above. Setting each of a, b and c to FALSE, we see that only a and b are enabled. 
If either of these occur, then c will become enabled in the resulting automaton, 
since (T v p) = T. (We use the symbol = to indicate equality in the Boolean algebra. 
At the propositional level, p = q if and only if p e q is a tautology.) 
The behaviour of C3 is rather different. If we set each of the events e, , e,, e3 
and e4 to FALSE then e, and e3 become enabled since (F + F) = T. Either of these 
events may occur. If e, occurs then C3 evolves into the automaton 
since (T =+ eJ = e2. The further behaviour of automaton D is straightforward: the 
events ez, e3 and e4 are offered in that order. If, on the other hand, C3 were to 
engage in e3 initially then the events e4, e, and e2, in that order, will be offered 
subsequently. Although the event e3 is enabled in C3 it becomes disabled in D and 
remains so until e, has been offered. 
Example C2 uses NOT causality. If both a and b are set to FALSE then both 
events are seen to be enabled and either may occur. However, if a occurs this has 
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the effect of permanently disabling b and vice-versa. There is a close similarity 
between NOT causality and conflict in event structures. 
The events in a causal automaton do not correspond directly to actions but rather 
to occurrences of actions. It is customary to use a labelling function, 8: E + ~2, to 
associate an action with each event. As a general rule, the Latin letters a, b, c, e, , . . . 
will denote events, while Greek letters a, p, . . . will denote actions. In tabular 
descriptions of causal automata a third column will be used to indicate the labels 
of events, as shown below. 
el e3 * 6 Q 
e2 el P 
e3 e,=+e, a 
e4 e3 Y 
If this third column is omitted then the labelling function is deemed to be the 
identity and actions are identical with events. 
1.3. AND, OR causality 
Our intention in this paper is not to give a systematic treatment of causal automata, 
leaving that task to Causal Automata II. Instead, we feel it is best to show first that 
they are genuinely useful. Returning to the problem of confluence, we remarked 
above that purely parallel processes only require AND causality, while example C 
uses OR causality. This suggests that we investigate automata which only use AND 
and OR causality. More precisely, we shall say that the automaton E is a {A, v}- 
automaton if each p(e) can be written in terms of the generators of E using only 
the operations A and v, and possibly also the constant T. Cl above is a {A, v}- 
automaton while C2 and C3 are not. The main result of this paper is the following 
causal characterisation of confluence. 
Theorem 1.6. If E is a deterministic {A, v}-automaton then the set of action traces of 
E is a (finite) confluent trace set. Conversely, everyfinite confluent trace set is the set 
of action traces of some deterministic {A, v}-automaton. 
A deterministic automaton will be defined precisely in Section 2, but the discussion 
given in Section 1.1 should make it fairly clear what form the definition will take. 
Informally, 
Confluence = Determinism+{AND, OR} Causality. 
This makes it clear how confluence differs from pure parallelism. It differs twice as 
much. Pure parallelism is one dimensional, as measured by AND causality; con- 
fluence has an extra, orthogonal dimension of variability expressed by OR causality. 
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This result provides a syntactic approach to confluence although the syntax 
expresses causal relationships between events rather than process constructions. It 
still leaves unresolved the problem of constructing all confluent processes in CCS. 
One approach might be to use the process C itself as a template for a ternary derived 
operation in CCS which could implement OR causality.’ Such questions are beyond 
the scope of the present paper. 
It may be felt that Theorem 1.6 has too much of the flavour of formal language 
theory. It says in effect that a confluent trace set is one which is accepted by a 
suitable automaton. The use of the word automaton probably reinforces this. We 
feel this restricted viewpoint is justified because of the deterministic nature of the 
problem. 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that there are automata, which are not {A, v}- 
automata. which nonetheless have confluent sets of action traces. Example C5, 
has action traces {e, a, ab, abc}, which is certainly confluent. 
1.4. Restrictions, extensions and related work 
The definition of a causal automaton allows only a finite set of events. In keeping 
with this, Theorem 1.6 applies only to finite confluent trace sets. Clearly, this is a 
serious restriction. What can we say about the infinite case? 
The first point to note is that infinite sets of events allow the possibility of infinitary 
causal operations. In this respect infinitary OR is more palatable than infinitary 
AND and perhaps even essential for expressing unbounded choice. This discrepancy 
between AND and OR should warn us that the familiar dualities of classical 
propositional logic are threatened in the infinite case. Even more striking is the fact 
that there exists no free complete Boolean algebra on countably infinitely many 
generators, see [12, Section 4.101. These difficulties prompt us to reconsider the 
logic underlying our descriptions of causal relationships. Our use of classical 
propositional logic for causal automata is, to a great extent, a mechanical following 
of the path of least resistance. In the infinite case a more discriminating approach 
is required. In a sequel to the present paper, [S], we discuss the requirements for 
such a logic of causality and report on some promising experiments with geometric 
automata: automata based on geometric logic. 
There remains the question of whether Theorem 1.6 holds for infinite trace sets. 
We believe that such a result does hold, albeit with some finiteness restriction such 
’ This suggestion comes from Chris Tofts. 
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as finite branching of the trace set. One way to approach such a result is to step 
back and consider a more general problem. How do our automata relate to other 
concurrency formalisms? Their closest relatives are undoubtedly Winskel’s event 
structures. We refer here to the most general kinds of event structure which Winskel 
has studied in [23 and 241. Both formalisms are based on an underlying set of 
events; they differ in the fuel which drives their behaviour. Event structures use a 
mixture of consistency and enablement, cf. [23, Definition 1.1.11, while causal 
automata run on what one might call “pure causality”. In [S] we show that Winskel’s 
general event structures have a natural interpretation as geometric automata. 
This general result allows us to return to the problem of confluent trace sets. We 
now have at our disposal the representation theorem for event structures’ in Winskel’s 
thesis, [4,24]. From a confluent trace set we construct an appropriate domain which 
satisfies the conditions of Winskel’s theorem. The finiteness restrictions are crucial 
here. Winskel’s representation theorem gives an event structure. Our interpretation 
of event structures then unravels the causal relationships and gives a geometric 
automaton which only uses {AND, OR} causality. We hope to give precise details 
of this argument in a future paper. 
The connection between causal automata and Petri nets is also important. We 
feel that nets must contain, perhaps even conceal, all manner of causal relationships. 
Yakovlev [25] has studied place/transition nets from an order-theoretic standpoint 
and has found that persistent nets give rise to {AND, OR}-semi-modular- 
behaviour. It is interesting to note that the motivation for this study comes from 
the design of so-called speed independent circuits. Semi-modular phenomena were 
first studied by David Muller in his pioneering investigations into the design of 
asynchronous hardware ([14, Chapter lo]). The current resurgence of interest in 
the design of self-timed systems, cf. [21], suggests that the study of {AND, OR} 
causality is timely. 
1.5. Summary 
The proof of Theorem 1.6 falls into two distinct parts. The heart of the argument 
is in Section 3 where the result is proved first for event traces. The labelling and 
the property of determinism are not relevant at this point. An important result in 
Section 3 is Lemma 3.1 which identifies the crucial characteristic property of 
{AND, OR} causality. In Section 4 these initial results are used to prove the first 
part of the theorem. It is here that the assumption of determinism becomes essential. 
Section 5 contains the proof of the second part of Theorem 1.6. The details in 
Sections 4 and 5 have a different flavour to those in Section 3 and largely concern 
the properties of strings and of labellings rather than of {AND, OR} causality. Section 
2 contains the initial definitions and some preparatory material on traces and 
confluence. 
’ The significance of which was pointed out to us by an anonymous ICALP referee 
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2. Causal automata 
This section covers the initial definitions and lemmas needed for the proof of 
Theorem 1.6. We begin by recalling the definition given in the Introduction. 
Definition 2.1. A causa1 automaton is a triple (E, p, e) where 
0 E is a finite set of events; 
l p : E - BE is a function to the free Boolean algebra, BE, generated by E; 
l f?: E + ~4 is a labelling function to some set ti of actions. 
We shall refer to an automaton by its set E of events and where necessary use 
subscripts, pE and tEE, to make it clear which causal automaton is being referred to. 
Definition 2.2. If S is some set of Boolean operations then E is an S-automaton if 
for all e E E, p(e) can be expressed using only operations from the set S together 
with the constant T. 
A valuation v of a set E is a function v: E + {T, F} which assigns a truth value 
to each element of E. Note that any valuation on E lifts uniquely to a function 
BE + {T, F} which is also denoted v. It is convenient to think of valuations as 
characteristic functions and to identify v with the subset of elements {e E E 1 v(e) = T}. 
With this identification, v, E v2 indicates that if v,(e) = T, then v2( e) = T. Let vF be 
the valuation which corresponds to the empty subset of E so that z+(e) = F for all 
eE E. 
Definition 2.3. If (E, p, t?) is a causal automaton, the event e E E is enabled if 
v&(e)) =T. 
The idea of enabled events permits the definition of an operational semantics for 
causal automata. 
Definition 2.4. If E,, El are causal automata and e E E, is an event, then E, q E7 
if and only if 
l e is enabled in E,; 
l Ez= E,-(e); 
l Vx E El p&,(x) = p,,(x)[e - T] (substitute T for e in pE,(x)); 
. Vx E Ez tic?(x) = l,,(x). 
If (Y E A is an action, then E, q Ez if and only if E, s Ez for some event e with 
e(e) = LY. 
The event and action relations defined above extend in the usual way to relations 
over strings of events or strings of actions. If E, F are causal automata and s = 
e,e2. + .e,,E E* is a string of events, then E & F if there are causal automata 
EC,,..., E, such that 
e1 CI CM 
E=E,-E,+...+E,=F. 
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It is always true that E 3 E. If E & F for some s E E” then s is said to be an event 
trace of E. The set of all event traces is truces,(E). 
Similar definitions hold for strings of actions. If E is a causal automaton over 
the labels .& then (T E &* is an action trace of E if for some event trace s = e, . . . e, 
we have (T = e(e,) . . . [(e,,). If also E 2 F then we use the notation E 3 F for the 
corresponding action trace. The set of action traces is tracesA( In general we 
shall use Latin letters s, t, . . for event traces and Greek letters V, 7,. . . for action 
traces. 
An event trace, in contrast to an action trace, is always a pure string: each event 
appears at most once in the string. Event traces hence give rise to subsets of events 
or to valuations. If s E traces,(E), let U, denote the valuation corresponding to the 
subset of events in s. 
u,(e) = 
T if e appears in s, 
F otherwise. 
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that E 3 Ffor some event trace s of E. The event a E F is enabled 
in F if and only if v,(p,(a)) =T in E. 
Proof. If vF denotes the all-FALSE valuation on F, it is clear from the operational 
semantics that V&~(Q)) = v,(p,(a)). The result follows. 0 
Recall that a trace set T over some alphabet A is a subset T G A* such that E E T 
and if sty T then s E T. It is clear that both truces,(E) and traces,(E) are trace 
sets. If T is a trace set and s E T, then T/s denotes “T after s”, in the sense of [ 10, 
Section 1 X3]: 
T/s={t(st~ T}. 
The symbol “1” is being used in two different senses in this paper depending on 
whether the left operand is a trace or a trace set. Both usages are sanctioned by 
custom and we hope that no confusion will result. T/s is undefined if s& T. Note 
that T/E = T and that T/s,s2= (T/s,)/s?. 
Lemma 2.6. If E is a causal automaton and E 3 Ffor some event trace s of E then 
trucesE( F) = traces,( E )/ s. 
Proof. It is clear that truces,(F) G traces,( E)/s. For the other direction suppose 
that t E truces,( E)/s so that st E truce.+(E). Then by definition E 3 E, & E,. Com- 
paring E, and F, we see that they have both been obtained from E by removing 
the same set of events; namely, those events which appear in the string s. Similarly, 
the causality functions of both automata are obtained from that of E by replacing 
the same generators with T. Finally, the labelling functions are clearly identical. So 
E, = F and t E traces,(F) as required. 0 
The excess operation defined in Section 1.1 has many interesting properties. The 
following are particularly useful, cf. [16, Section 11.31. 
s/t = s if s and t have no elements in common 
slt,fZ=(s/tl)lt? 
s,s,lt = (s,lt).(sJ(tls,)) 
Following the precedent of [16], we leave the proofs as exercises for the reader. In 
reasoning about the excess operation, it is useful to be able to count the number 
of occurrences of a particular element in the string. Multisets provide a convenient 
language for this. 
Definition 2.7. A multiset f over the set A is a function f: A + N from A to the 
natural numbers N. The set of multisets over A is denoted A”. 
A string s E A gives rise to a multiset [s] over A as follows: 
[E](U) = 0 Vu E A; 
[s](a)+1 if b=u, 
[bsl(a) = (rsl(a, otherwise. 
A multiset f E AN is a set if f(u) = 0 or 1 for all a E A. Note that a string s E A* is 
pure if and only if [s] is a set. Furthermore, s and t are permutations of each other 
if and only if [s] = [t]. It is convenient to regard elements of A as strings of length 
1, so that if a E A then [a] is the multiset having the value 1 at a and 0 everywhere 
else. The usual operations and relations on numbers (+, G, . .) lift pointwise to 
operations on multisets. 
The following result collects together some elementary properties of strings which 
will be used later. It makes clear in what sense the operation s/t is one of “excess”. 
Lemma 2.8. Ifs, t E A* are truces and a, b E A then 
(1) [stl = [sl+ [fl, 
(2) 1 [tl [jib]= [t]-[b] if [t](b) = 0, otherwise, 
(3) 
[sl(a)-[tl(a) if [sl(a)>[tl(a), 
[slrl(u) = { o 
otherwise, 
(4) [s(tls)l= [r(slt)l. 
Proof. (1) By induction over the length of s. Ifs = E the result follows immediately. 
Suppose that s = bs, and the result holds for s, . Choose a E A. If a = b then by the 
definitionofthebracketfunction[bs,t](u)=[s,t](u)+1while[bs,](u)=[s,](u)+1. 
By the inductive hypothesis [~,t](u)=[.~,](u)+[t](u). Hence, [st](u)=[s](u)+ 
[t](u).Ifu# bthen[bs,t](u)=[s,t](u)and[bs,](u)=[s,](u)andtheresultfollows 
similarly. This proves (1). 
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(2) First suppose that b does not appear in t, in other words that [t](b) = 0. Then 
t and b have no element in common and by a remark made above, t/b = t. Hence, 
[t/b] = [t] as required. Now suppose that b does appear in t. Then we can write t 
in the form ubv where we may suppose that b does not appear in u. Note that u 
may be the empty string. It follows that t/b = ubv/b = (u/b).(bv/(b/u)). But b and 
u have no elements in common and so u/b = u and b/u = b. Hence t/b = u( bv/ b) = 
uv. So we have [t/b]=[u]+[v] while [t]=[u]+[b]+[v]. It follows that [t/b]= 
[t] - [b] as required. This proves (2). 
(3) We proceed by induction over the length of t. If t = E then s/t = s for any s 
and the result is easily seen to hold. If t = b where b E A then the result follows 
from part (2). This starts off the induction. Now assume that t = t,t2, where neither 
t, nor t, is the empty string, and the result holds for t, and t, separately, with any 
s as the left-hand argument. 
Suppose first that [s](a) > [t](u). Then since [t] = [t,] +[ t7] by part (l), we must 
have [s](a)>[t,](a). Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis for t,, [s/t,](u)= 
[s](u) -[t,](u). Furthermore, [s/t,](u) > [t,](u). Hence by the inductive hypothesis 
for t2, 
= [sl(a) - [tl(a). 
The required result follows since s/t = (s/ tl)/ t,. 
Now suppose that [s](u)G[t](u). If [s](u)C[t,](u), then by the inductive 
hypothesis for t,, [s/t,](u) = 0 and clearly [s/t,](u) G [t?](u). Hence by the inductive 
hypothesis for t2, [s/t](u) = 0 as required. If on the other hand [s](u)> [t,](u), 
then by the inductive hypothesis for t,, [s/t,](u) = [s](u) -[t,](u). But, [s/t,](u)> 
[t,](u) for otherwise [s](u) > [t](u). So by the inductive hypothesis for t,, 
[(s/t,)/tJ(u)=O and so [s/t](u)=0 as required. 
(4) Choose a E A and suppose that [s](u)> [t](u). Then, by part (3), 
[s(t/s)](u)=[s](u)+O while [t(s/t)](u)=[t](u)+[s](u)-[t](u)=[s](u). Hence 
[s(t/s)](u) = [t(s/t)](u). By symmetry of s and t the result follows. 0 
We can now prove some elementary properties of confluent trace sets. 
Lemma 2.9. Suppose that T is a conjluent truce set. The following statements are true. 
(1) If t E T, then T/t is also confluent. 
(2) Z’p, q E T and [p] = [q] then T/p = T/q. 
Proof. (1) Choose r, s E T/t. Then tr, ts E T and since T is confluent tr( ts/ tr) E T 
But ts/tr=(ts/t)/r=((t/t).(s/(t/t)))/r= / s r since, by Lemma 2.8(3), t/t = E. It 
follows that r(s/r) E T/t and hence T/t is confluent. 
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(2) If [p] = [s] then it follows from Lemma 2.8(3) that p/q = q/p = E. If u E T/p 
then pu E T and since T is confluent, q(pu/q) is also in T. But pu/q = 
(p/q)( u/(q/p)) = u. Hence qu E T and u E T/q. So T/p G T/q and by symmetry, 
T/p = T/q as required. q 
This completes the preparatory material. In the next section we begin the proof 
of the main results. 
3. AND, OR causality 
We begin this section with a simple observation about Boolean expressions built 
up using only AND and OR. 
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that p E: BE is an element of the free Boolean algebra over E 
other than F. p can be expressed using only the operations T, A and v if and only if 
for any valuations v,, v2 such that v, 5 v2 and v,(p) =T, it,follows that Q(P) =T. 
Proof. Suppose that p is expressed using only the operations T, A and v and suppose 
given a pair of valuations such that v, G v2 and v,(p) =T. Since FsT in the partial 
order of the Boolean algebra and both A and v are monotonic, it follows immediately 
that v,(p) s vz(p). Hence v?(p) = T as required. 
Now suppose that p E BE satisfies the valuation property in the statement of the 
lemma. Define a valuation w to be minimal with respect to p if w(p) = T but v(p) = F 
for any v c w. Since p f F, minimal valuations must exist. 
It may happen that vF is a minimal valuation for p. If v is any valuation, then 
v(p) = T since vF G v. Hence p = T and there is nothing to prove. 
So assume that vF is not a minimal valuation for p. Note that any minimal valuation 
w must then have some e E E such that w(e) = T. Let {w, , w2, . , w,} be the set of 
minimal valuations of p and let e vary over elements of E. Define 
which is well defined by the preceding remark. (T is expressed in terms of the 
generators of BE using only the operations A and v. We claim that p = (T in BE. 
It suffices to show that v(p) = v(a) for any valuation v. 
Suppose given a valuation v. If v(p) = T then there must exist a (not necessarily 
unique) minimal valuation w, of p such that w, c v. But if e E E and w,(e) =T, then 
clearly v(e) = T. Hence, v(/\,~,(~)_~ (e)) = T and so V(U) = T. 
Now suppose that V(V) =T. Then for some 1 ~js n, v(A,~,(~,=~ (e)) =T. Hence, 
for each e E E such that w,(e) = T we must have v(e) = T. In other words, w, 5 v. 
But, w,(p) =T and so, by the valuation property, u(p) =T. Hence p = (T. This 
completes the proof. 0 
We have spelt out this proof in some detail because the valuation behaviour is 
the only property of {A, v}-causality which is subsequently used. It is therefore 
important to know that this property characterises {A, v}-causality.4 
We shall say that a trace set is pure if every string in the set is pure; the event 
traces of any causal automaton always form a pure trace set. 
Proposition 3.2. If E is a {A, v}-automaton then truces,(E) is a (,$nite) pure conjluent 
trace set. 
Proof. Choose s, t E traces,(E). We have to show that t(s/ t) E traces,(E). The proof 
is by induction on the length of s. If s = E then t(s/ t) = t and there is nothing to 
prove. So suppose that s = s,a and assume that t(s,/ t) has been shown to be an 
event trace of E. We then have s/t=(s,/t).(a/(t/s,)). If a appears in t/s, then 
a/( t/s,) = F and s/t = s,/ t. By the inductive hypothesis t(s,/ t) E traces,(E) and 
there is nothing more to do. 
So assume that a does not appear in t/s, in which case s/t = (s,/t)a. Since event 
traces are pure, it is clear that [s,](a) = 0. By Lemma 2X(3), [t](a) = 0, for otherwise 
a would appear in t/s,. Furthermore, again by Lemma 2.8(3), [s,/ t] s [s,] and so 
[s,/t](a) = 0. It follows that a does not appear in the trace t(s,/t). 
By the inductive hypothesis, there is an automaton F such that E 3 F. 
Evidently, a E F. All we have to do is to show that a is actually enabled in F. By 
Lemma 2.5, this amounts to showing that ~l,,~,,,)(~~(u)) :=T. 
Since s, is also an event trace, there is an automaton G such that E 3 G. By 
Lemma 2.6, we know that a E traces,(G) and must hence be enabled in G. By 
Lemma 2.5, v,,(p,(a)) =T. 
But now, from Lemma 2.8(4), [s,]~ [t(s,/t)]. The events which appear in each 
of these traces are precisely those which have the value T in the corresponding 
valuations. Hence, v,, c_ u,( ,,,,) and the required result follows immediately from 
Lemma 3.1. 0 
The next result is a converse to Proposition 3.2. It is the central part of the proof 
of Theorem 1.6. Since we are not at present interested in action traces, the labellings 
on our causal automata are irrelevant and we shall assume that they are always the 
identity function. 
Proposition 3.3. If T is a jinite pure confluent trace set then there exists a {A, v}- 
automaton E such that traces,(E) = T. 
Proof. It is convenient for the proof to enlarge the conclusions of the proposition. 
Suppose that A is the set of all elements which appear in the strings of T, so that 
’ The significance and importance of this result becomes much clearer in the infinite case, cf. [S] 
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T s A* and A is the smallest set with this property. What we shall prove is that if 
T is pure and confluent then there is a {A, v}-automaton, of the specific form (A, p), 
such that fraces,(A) = T. 
The proof is by induction over the size of the trace set T. If T = {e} then the 
empty causal automaton has both the right form and the right traces. This starts off 
the induction. Now choose T, a nontrivial pure confluent trace set, and suppose 
that all pure confluent trace sets of strictly smaller size have been shown to fulfil 
the conclusion stated in the previous paragraph. Let e, , e?, . . . , e, be all the events 
which appear initially on some string of T. In other words, e, E T for 1 G is n and 
if t E T and t # e then t = e,s for some i. By Lemma 2.9(l), T/e, is a confluent trace 
set which is clearly pure and of strictly smaller size to T. By the inductive hypothesis 
there exists a {A, v}-automaton A, such that traces,(A,) = T/e,. We shall use p, to 
denote the causality function for the ith automaton, p, : Ai + BA,. 
Letf,,.L,. . . , fm be the elements other than e, , e,, . . . , e, which appear in strings 
of T and, as above, let 
We need to construct a causal automaton on this specific set of events. 
It is clear by the purity of T that the event e, does not appear on any string in 
T/e,. However, by confluence of T, it is easy to see that every other event in A must 
appear in some string of T/e,. It follows from the expanded inductive hypothesis 
that Ai = A -{ei}. In particular, p,(J) is defined for each 1 G i s n and 1 d j G m and 
we may take it that p,(J) E BA. This allows us to define the following {A, v}- 
automaton (A, p) of the required form. 
p(c) =T ISiGn 
P(_O=,_LJ,z(eiAP,(.h)) l+sm. 
We claim that traces,(A) = T 
The first point to note is that the enabled events of A are precisely e, , e,, . . . , e,, 
for clearly z+(p(A)) = F for any 1 G J ‘G WI. Hence there are causal automata B, for 
lsisn such that AL Bi. Moreover, it is clear that B, and A, have the same sets 
of events, namely A -{e,}. We would be done if it were true that B, = A, as causal 
automata. It is important to realise that this need not be the case. However, what 
we shall show is that fraces,( B,) = traces,(A,). It follows easily from Lemma 2.6 
that this is sufficient to show truces,(A) = T The remainder of the proof is hence 
concerned with showing that truces,( B,) = truces,(A,). Since the proof is the same 
for each index i it will be convenient and no less general to do the case i = 1. This 
will cut down on the number of indices which appear in the text. 
We shall start by showing truces,(A,) c truces,( B,). The proof is by induction on 
the length of strings in truces,(A,). It is clear that EE Iraces, which starts off 
the induction. So suppose that TV truces,(A,) is a nonempty string and that all 
strings in truces,(A,) of strictly smaller length have been shown to be in trucesd B,). 
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We can write t = se where e E A, is an event and s E truces,(A,) is a string of strictly 
smaller length than t. By the inductive hypotheses s E traces,(B,) and e,s E 
truces,(A). If e is one of the e,, it will be permanently enabled and clearly se E 
truces,(B,) and there is nothing to prove. So assume that e is one of the J;. From 
the description of the automaton A given above, it is easy to see that 
u,,,b(e)) = u,(p,(e)) v (. . .), 
where the exact nature of the omitted elements is not relevant. 
Now by assumption, seE truces,(A,), and so by Lemma 2.5, u,(p,(e)) =T. It 
follows immediately that v,,,(P(e)) =T. Hence by Lemma 2.5 else E truces,(A) and 
so by Lemma 2.6, t = se E truces,(B,). It follows by induction that truces,(A,) G 
trucesE( B,). 
It remains to prove the opposite inclusion, trucesE( B,) c truces,(A,). As before 
the proof is by induction on the length of strings. Suppose that t E trucesE( B,) is a 
nonempty string and all strings of strictly smaller length in trucesE(B,) have been 
shown to be in truces,(A,). We may write t = se where e E B, and s E truces,( B,) is 
a string of strictly smaller length to which the inductive hypothesis applies. Hence 
s E trucesE(A,). Suppose first that e is one of the e,. Because T is confluent, e E T/e, 
and hence e must be enabled in A,. By Lemma 3.1, it must be the case that p,(e) = T. 
Therefore e is permanently enabled in A, and clearly se E trucesE(A,). 
Now suppose that e is one of the jj. Because se E truces,( B,), we know from 
Lemma 2.5 that u,, , (p (e)) = T in BA. Note that the Boolean expression p,(e) E BA, 
does not involve the generator e,. Furthermore, if ej appears in s then by purity we 
may write (e,s)/e, = e,(s/e,). This allows us to simplify the expression for p(e) as 
shown below. 
q.Jde)) = vh(e)) v ( V I\l(e,)=l 4,i.i..,,(p,(e))). 
Hence, either v,(p,(e)) =T or there must be some k, with [s](el) = 1, such that 
u,,C,lC&k(e)) =T in AL. 
If the former then, by Lemma 2.5, se E truces,(A,) and we are done. So suppose 
the latter. Since e,s and e, are both in T, and T is confluent, it follows that 
e,((e,s)/e,,) = eke,(s/ek) E T. Hence, e,(s/ek) E T/ek and so by Lemma 2.5 applied 
to A,, we see that e,(s/ek)eE T/cl,. It follows that e,e,(s/e,)eE T which we may 
rewrite as saying that eE T/(e,e,(s/e,)). 
Note that e,s(ek/(e,s))=e,s, since ek appears in s, and so by Lemma 2.8(4), 
[e,s] = [eke,(s/ek)]. Since T is confluent, Lemma 2.9(2) tells us that eE T/(e,s). In 
other words, se E T/e,. Hence t E truces,(A,) as required. It follows by induction 
that truces,( B,) E truces,(A,). 
We have shown that for each 1 c is n, T/e, = truces,( B,) and it follows as 
remarked above that T = truces,(A). Since A is a {A, v}-automaton on the correct 
set of events, the proposition follows by induction. 0 
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4. Deterministic automata 
We now consider how to extend the results above to action traces. The first point 
to note is that Proposition 3.2 is false, as stated, if action traces are used in place 
of event traces. Consider the following {A, v}-automaton. 
C6= 
It is easy to see that afi and cuy are action traces of C6. But CY~/CY/~ = y and the 
string a/?~ = (~p(cyy/~yp) is not an action trace of C6. Hence traces,( C6) is not 
confluent. 
The missing ingredient is determinism. The following definition is a natural 
extension of Vaandrager’s definition [22, Section 3.61, of determinism in prime event 
structures. 
Definition 4.1. A causal automaton E is deterministic if, whenever E j F for some 
event trace s of E, all enabled events in F have distinct labels. 
If F does have two enabled events with the same label, a, and u is the action 
trace corresponding to s, then we may have E 2 E, and E 3 El where E, and E2 
are distinct. This is contrary to the intuition for determinism presented in Section 1.1. 
The labelling function e of an automaton A gives rise to a function on traces 
k’* : traces,(E) + traces,(E). 
This is, of course, always a surjection: every action trace arises from some underlying 
event trace. It is not in general a bijection. However, the reader will easily see that 
the following lemma is merely a restatement of the definition above. 
Lemma 4.2. An automaton (E, p, 4’) is deterministic if and only iJ’l* is a hijection. 
For {A, v}-automata we can say rather more. It will be convenient to allow k?* 
to act, in the obvious way, on elements of E* which are not necessarily event traces 
of E. Note that, with this proviso, k’* always commutes with juxtaposition: [*(St) = 
e*(s)e*(t). 
Lemma 4.3. Suppose the (E, p, 8) is a {A, v}-automaton. E is deterministic if and 
only if.!* commutes with excess. (It is not asserted, and it is not in general true, that 
truces,(E) is closed under the excess operation.) 
Proof. Suppose first that E is deterministic. Choose s, t E traces,(E). We have to 
show that [*(s/t) = f*(s)/e*(t). The proof is by induction on the length of the 
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second argument t. If t = e then S/E = s and e*(t) = F so clearly .!?*(s/t) = e*(s) = 
e*(s)/e*( t). 
Now suppose that I = a where a is an event in E and let e(a) = (Y. There are two 
cases according as [s](a) = 0 or [s](a) > 0. Suppose the first, so that a does not 
appear in s. 
We claim that then Q does not appear in k’*(s). Suppose on the contrary that it 
does and write e*(s) =~.cY.v where [II](LY) =O. We can similarly write s = m.e.n 
where k’*(m) = p, e(e) = cy and e*(n) = v. It is clear that a does not appear in m 
for otherwise (Y would necessarily appear in p. Since me E truces,(E) it follows 
from Lemma 2.5 that v,,(P(e)) = T. Also z+(p(a)) =T since a is enabled in E. But 
V,G u, and so, by Lemma 3.1, v,(p(u)) =T. Hence, by Lemma 2.5 again, if E 3 F 
then both a and e are enabled in F. But e(u) = e(e) = a which contradicts the fact 
that E is deterministic. This shows that LY does not appear in e*(s). It follows from 
Lemma 2.8(2) that both s/u =s and e*(s)//*(u)=/*(s). Hence, /*(s/u) = 
/*(~)/[*(a) as required. 
Now suppose that a does appear in s. We may write s = m.u.n where [m](u) = 0. 
Then e*(s) = l*(m).cr.k’*(n) and by the preceding paragraph [i?*(m)](a) =O. It is 
then easy to see that s/u = mn and, by a similar argument, that k’*(s)/c~ = 
t’*(m)t?*(n). It follows that [*(s/u) = k’*(s)//*(u) as required. 
This argument suffices to start off the induction. Suppose now that we have 
t E truces,(E) of length greater than 1 and that the result has been shown to hold 
(for arbitrary first argument) for all event traces of length strictly less than t. We 
can write t = t,f2 where both t, and t, have length strictly less than t. Then 
k’*(s/(t,t,)) = /*((s/t,)/f2) = J*(s/r,)//*(t,) by the inductive hypothesis applied 
to t,. Proceeding further, by the inductive hypothesis applied to f, , e*(s/ t,) = 
/*(s)/e*(t,). Hence, [*(s/t) = (/*(~)/k’*(t,))/!*(t~) = !*(s)/(c*(t,)k’*(t,)) = 
P*(s)/e*(t) as required. It follows by induction that /* commutes with excess. 
For the other direction suppose that k’* commutes with excess. Suppose further 
that there are s, t E truces,(E) for which e*(s) = e*(t) but s # t. 
For any string u let uk, where k B 0, denote the prefix of u of length k and let 
1~1 denote the length of the string U. Note that &*(sk) = k’*(t,) for 0s kc IsI and 
that 1st = Itl. Now there must be some i with 1s id 1.~1 such that [s,] # [ti], for if not 
it is easy to show by induction that s = t. 
Consider si/ti. If this were the empty string, a, then by Lemma 2.8(3) [s,]~ [t,] 
and since s, and t, have the same length, this would force [s,] = [j,]. Hence s,/ ti # F. 
But, however, e*(s,) = J*(t,) and so /*(s,)//*( ti) = E. It follows that &*(s,/t,) # 
f?*(s,)/k’*(t,) which contradicts the assumption that $* commutes with excess. It 
follows that /* must be bijective and hence, by Lemma 4.2, that E must be 
deterministic. 0 
It is worth pointing out that the second part of the proof above does not use the 
fact that E is a {A, v}-automaton. Note that there are deterministic automata, which 
are not {A, v}-automata, for which J* does not commute with excess. For instance, 
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has the following sets of traces: 
truces,( C7) = {E, a, b, ab, be, abe, bea}, 
traces,( C7) = {E, (Y, p, crUp, pa, apa, PCYCX}. 
It is clear that e* is bijective since the trace sets have the same size. Hence, 
by Lemma 4.2, C7 is deterministic. However, l*(ab/be) = J*(a) = a, while 
l*(ab)/k’*(be) = ap/pcy = E. So e* does not commute with excess. 
It is now a simple matter to prove the first part of Theorem 1.6. 
Theorem 4.4. If E is a deterministic {A, v}-automaton then traces,(E) is a jinite 
conjluent trace set. 
Proof. Choose action traces p, v E traces,(E). Let m, n E traces,(E) be event traces 
such that f*(m) = p and l*(n) = V. By Proposition 3.2, truces,(E) is confluent and 
so certainly m(n/m) E traces,(E). Hence k’*( m(n/m)) is an action trace. But now 
Lemma 4.3 shows that k’*(m(n/m))=p(v/p). So p(~/p)~ truces,(E) and 
truces,(E) is confluent. This completes the proof. 0 
5. Numbered traces 
An arbitrary confluent trace set is not in general pure. In this section we present 
a method for constructing a pure trace set from any given trace set. The main result 
is that this method preserves confluence. This allows us to use Proposition 3.3 to 
prove the second part of Theorem 1.6. Let N’ denote the positive natural numbers. 
Definition 5.1. Given a set A, the numbering function p: A* x A* -+ (AX N’)” is 
given inductively by the equations 
p(r, E) = e 
cL(r, sa) = p(r, ~).(a, [rl(a)+[sl(a)+ 1). 
We shall use the shorthand: P~-( s) = p( r, s) and p(s) = pL,(s). It is easy to see that 
if [pl=[ql then ,+=A,, so that p factors over A”x A*. As an example of a 
numbered string, if t = aabacaccb, then p(t) is 
(a, l)(a, 2)(b, l)(a, 3)(c, l)(a, 4)(c, 2)(c, 3)(b, 2). 
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The effect of the first argument is to translate the numbering: if r = bcbecc then pul( t) 
is 
(a, I)(a, 2)(b, 3)(a, 3)(c, 4)(a, 4)(c, %(c, 6)(b, 4). 
Unlike t, both these strings are pure. The numbering function satisfies many interest- 
ing identities and the next result collects together those which are of immediate 
benefit to us. To avoid unnecessary complication, we have chosen not to state these 
in their most general form. 
Lemma 5.2. Let A be a set and r, s E A* be strings over A. The following statements 
are true. 
(1) rP(s)l(% k) = 
1 
0 ifk>[sl(a), 
1 otherwise, 
(2) p(rs) = pL(r)kb(s). 
(3) h(rls) = p(r)/p(s). 
(4) p(r(sIr)) = p(r)(p(s)/p(r)). 
Proof. (1) By induction on the length of s. Ifs = E then from the definition p(s) = e. 
Hence [p(s)]( (I, k) = 0. Since k > 0 by convention, certainly k > [s](u) and so 
the result is true. Now suppose that s E A* is nonempty and the result has been 
shown to hold for all strings of length strictly less than s. We can write s = tb where 
b E A and the inductive hypothesis applies to t. Then, by definition, p(s) = 
p(r).(b, [t](b)+ 1). 
Consider the two cases separately. If k > [s](u) then certainly k > [t](u) and 
so by the inductive hypothesis b(t)l(a, k) = 0. Hence b(s)l(a, k) = 
[(b, [t](b) + l)](u, k). If a # b then this is certainly zero. If a = b then still k > [s](u) = 
[t](u)+l. Hence [p(s)](u, k)=O as required. 
Now suppose k G [s](u). If also k s [t](u) then by the inductive hypothesis 
[p(t)](u, k)=l. Since (b,[t](b)+l)#(u, k) it follows that [p(s)](u, k)=l as 
required. If, on the other hand, k > [t](u) then again by the inductive hypothesis 
b(t)l(a, k)=O. However, [sl(a)=[tl(a)+[bl( ) a , so it must be the case that a = b 
and k=[s](u). But then (b,[r](b)+l)=(u,k) andso [,u(s)](u,k)=l as required. 
(2) By induction on the length of s. If s = e then the result is easily seen to hold. 
So suppose that s is a nonempty string and that the result has been shown to hold 
for all strings of strictly smaller length and arbitrary r. We may write s = tu where 
a E A and the inductive hypothesis applies to t. Then, p( rs) = p(( rt)u) = 
p(r)p.,(t)(u, [r-t](u) + 1). And on the other hand, by definition, p.,(tu) = 
p.,(t).(u,[r](u)+[t](u)+l). It follows from Lemma 2.8(l) that p(r.s)=p(r).p,(s). 
(3) By induction on the length of r. If r = E then the result is easily seen to hold. 
So suppose that r is a nonempty string and that the result holds for all strings of 
length strictly less than r and arbitrary s. We may write r = tu where a E A and the 
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inductive hypothesis applies to t. Since ta/s = (t/s)(a/(s/t)), it is easy to see from 
Lemma 2.8(3) that 
tals = 
(tls)a if [sl(a)s [tl(a), 
(t/s) otherwise. 
We shall consider each of these cases separately. First suppose that [s](a) G [t](a). 
Then, 
/-4tals) = Pu,((~lsb) = (P(~)lPu(s)Ka, [sl(a)+[tlsl(a)+ 1). 
On the other hand, 
p(ta)lpL(s) = p(t)(a, [tl(a)+ 1)/P(S). 
But, by part (I), [p(s)](a,[t](a)+l)=O since [t](a)+l>[s](a). Similarly, 
[~(t)](a,[t](a)+l)=O since [t](a)+l>[t](a). Hence, [~(s)](~~,[t](u)+l)~ 
[p( t)](a, [t](a)+ 1). So by the previous paragraph, applied to numbered strings, 
we see that p(ta)/p(s) = (p(t)/p(s))(a, [t](a)+ 1). Finally, by Lemma 2.8(3), 
[t/s](a)=[t](a)-[s](u). So p,(r/s)=p(r)/p(s) as required. 
Now suppose that [s](a)>[t](a). Then pLS(ta/s)=p,(t/s)=p(I)/p(s). Also 
p(ta)lp(s) = (p(t)(a, itI(a)+ ~))/P(s). But now, by part (11, bL(s)l(a, [t](a)+ 
1) = 1 since [t](a)+ls[s](a) and similarly [p(t)](a, [t](a)+ 1) =O. Hence, 
b(s)l(a, [tICa>+ 1) > bu(t)l(a, [tICa)+ 1) and, as remarked above, this shows that 
(p(t)(a, [t](a)+ l))IpL(s) = p.(t)Ip(s). Hence pL,(rIs) = pcL(r)IpL(s) asrequired. 
(4) BY parts (2) and (3), p(r(sIr)) = p(r)p,(sIr) = ~(~)(~(s)l~(r)). 0 
Let n : A x Nt --$ A be the projection on to the first component of a numbered 
pair: ~(a, k) = a. This extends in the usual way to a function on strings: 
7~* : (A x N+)* + A*. It is easy to see from the definition of the numbering function 
that n*(pL,(s)) = s. We can now prove the result which we have been working towards. 
Theorem 5.3. If T is a jinite conjluent trace set, there exists a deterministic {A, v}- 
automaton, E, such that traces,(E) = T. 
Proof. Let A be the set of elements which appear in the traces of T and let 
p ( T) c (A x N’)” be the corresponding set of numbered traces: p ( T) = {p(t) 1 t E T}. 
It follows from Lemma .5.2(l) that p(T) is pure and from Lemma 5.2(4) that p(T) 
is confluent. Hence, by Proposition 3.3, there exists a {A, v}-automaton E such that 
traces,(E) = p(T). 
In the construction of E the labelling function was not relevant and was taken 
to be the identity. We are at liberty to provide an alternative. It is clear that E G A x Nt 
so we can take .!?E = TTT(~, the restriction to E of the projection function defined 
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above. If p( t) E traces,(E) then e”,(k( t)) = rr*( p( t) j = 1. It follows that traces,(E) = 
T It is also clear that /*, is bijective and hence, by Lemma 4.2, that E is deterministic. 
The result follows. q 
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.6. 
6. Conclusion 
We have introduced causal automata, a formalism based on a syntactic approach 
to causality, and we have used it to shed light upon Milner’s notion of confluence 
in CCS. The formalism takes a less impoverished view of causality than is customary 
in models based upon partial orders. We feel that it has the virtue of simplicity and 
that the operational behaviour of an automaton is particularly easy to understand, 
at least at a superficial level. A more systematic study of causality which tackles the 
difficulties with infinite sets of events will appear in a sequel to the present paper, [S]. 
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